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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v*

:

RICHARD LEE CRAWFORD,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 900172-CA

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the denial of a motion for a new
trial.

Defendant was convicted of theft and burglary of a

dwelling, both second degree felonies, after a trial in the
Fourth Judicial District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction to

hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)
(Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court properly deny defendant's

motion for a new trial based upon defendant's claim that the
prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence?

The decision to grant

or deny a motion for a new trial is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a
clear abuse of that discretion.

State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220,

223 (Utah 1985).
2.

Did the lower court properly deny defendant's

motion for a new trial based upon defendant's claim that the

prosecutor failed to call a particular witness?

(The same

standard as cited above is applicable.)
3.

Did the lower court properly deny defendant's

motion for new trial based upon defendant's claim that the
prosecutor mentioned evidence in his opening statement that was
not admitted into evidence during trial? (Same standard.)
4.

Did the lower court properly deny defendant's

motion for a new trial based upon defendant's claim that a
state's witness was intoxicated at trial?

(Same standard.)

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The relevant provisions relied upon by the State are
set forth in the argument section of the brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with burglary of a dwelling, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202
(1978), and theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) (R. 3-4). He was convicted on both
counts after a jury trial held December 7 and 8, 1988, in the
Fourth Judicial District Court, the Honorable Ray M. Harding,
Judge, presiding (R. 146-47, T. 1).

Judge Harding sentenced

defendant on January 10, 1989, to serve two concurrent terms of
one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison (R. 155-59).
Defendant filed a motion for a new trial on January 4,
1989 (R. 151-53).

Judge Harding denied defendant's motion on

April 24, 1989 in a Memorandum Decision (R. 185-86) (See
The record on appeal has been designated "R.", the trial
transcript has been designated "T.M, and the preliminary hearing
transcript has been designated "P.".
-2-

Appendices "A", Memorandum Decision; and "B", Order).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 25, 1988, six rooms at the Paradise Inn in
Fillmore, Utah, were burglarized (T. 58, 60, 66). The burglar
stole a television set, remote control and a bedspread from each
room (T. 67, 87). The bedspreads were rust in color, made of a
unique design, and had been bought from a motel supply company
that does not sell its wares to the general public (T. 65, 74,
80, 81). Sergeant John Kimball of the Millard County Sheriff's
Office found evidence of forced entry on the motel room doors and
subsequently recovered two stolen bedspreads, one from Steve
Johnson and the other from Margarite Byrge (T. 125, 126, 129).
At trial, Deputy James Masner of the Millard County
Sheriff's Office was qualified as a fingerprint expert and
positively identified defendant's latent fingerprint found on a
television mounting bracket in one of the burglarized motel rooms
(T. 168-69, 166, 174-75).

Richard Wright, a latent fingerprint

examiner at the State of Utah Crime Lab, concurred with Masner's
opinion (T. 237-41).

Masner also testified that a footprint

taken at the motel matched the tred from defendant's shoe (T.
181-82, 190-92).
During trial, defendant objected to the admission of
several screwdrivers and a pry bar on the basis that they were
illegally seized from defendant's vehicle (T. 221). The
prosecutor had previously mentioned these items in his opening
statement along with the fact that a large screwdriver or a pry
bar had apparently been used to break into the motel rooms (T.
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53-54 )•

The record is unclear whether the lower court suppressed

these items, or whether the prosecutor simply agreed not to offer
them into evidence (T. 233-35).

In either event, the items were

not offered or further mentioned.
Testifying on his own behalf, defendant denied that he
gave Byrge the bedspread (T. 254). He also claimed that he did
not buy the shoes Masner matched with the footprints at the crime
scene until the day after the motel burglary (T. 258). Finally,
he denied that he had been to the Paradise Inn in Fillmore, Utah
(T. 262-63).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to grant defendant's motion for a new trial based on
defendant's claim that the State withheld exculpatory information
in the form of a witness.

The trial court found that the

testimony at the preliminary hearing fully apprised defendant of
the witness's name and general testimony.

Additionally,

defendant was not prejudiced by the absence of the testimony
since it did nothing to undermine the overwhelming evidence of
defendant's guilt.
The lower court also did not abuse his discretion in
denying a new trial on the basis that the State failed to call
the alleged exculpatory witness.

The State has no obligation to

call witnesses on defendant's behalf.

Had defendant desired this

witness's testimony, he could have subpoenaed the witness
himself.
The lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying
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defendant's motion for new trial based on defendant's claim that
the prosecutor improperly mentioned evidence in his opening
statement which was not offered during trial.

Defendant did not

object to the opening statement at trial. Additionally, the
prosecutor in good faith referred to evidence which was
subsequently not offered due to defendant's belated suppression
motion raised in the midst of trial.

In any event, the

prosecutor's comments did not prejudice the trial's outcome.
The lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying
a new trial on defendant's claim that a State's witness was
intoxicated at trial.

Intoxication by itself does not make a

witness incompetent to testify, but instead goes to the witness's
credibility.

Defendant had an opportunity to explore this

witness's alleged intoxication, but chose not to do so. The
trial judge found no evidence of intoxication and no prejudice in
any event.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ALLEGED
UNDISCLOSED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
Defendant argues that the State withheld exculpatory
evidence consisting of Steven Johnson's statement that defendant
had given him the bedspread over a year before the motel
burglary.

(See Brief of Appellant at 6-7). He concludes that

the lower court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
new trial based on this ground.

Defendant's claim must fail.

Defendant had actual notice of Steven Johnson's
statement.

Judge Harding specifically found "that even though
-5-

Mr, Johnson was not present at the Preliminary Hearing, the
Defendant received all the information which he was entitled to
concerning the possible testimony of Mr. Johnson and the second
bedspread." (R. 232-33) (See Appendix "B"; Order).

The lower

court's finding was based upon the preliminary hearing testimony
of Deputy John Kimball who indicated that Johnson told him that
he obtained the bedspread from defendant approximately January 1,
1987 (P. 16). Accordingly, the lower court found that defendant
"had ample opportunity to call Mr. Johnson and examine him
concerning the bedspread, had the Defendant wanted to issue a
subpoena. (R. 232-33) (See Appendix "B"; Order).
Additionally, defendant's preliminary hearing included
three separate informations charging defendant with burglary and
theft of the Paradise Inn on three separate occasions; January
12, 1987, December 7, 1987 and February 25, 1988 (P.3, 73-75).
Defendant was bound over on all charges, but was tried separately
on the February 25, 1988 burglary (Id.).

Thus, the testimony of

Steve Johnson was not exculpatory for defendant, but was simply
relevant to the previous burglary.
POINT II
DEFENDANT CANNOT COMPLAIN THAT THE STATE DID
NOT CALL A WITNESS WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN
CALLED BY THE DEFENSE.
Defendant next claims that the State shpuld have called
Steve Johnson as a witness so that defendant could have crossexamined him.

Defendant's claim lacks merit.

While defendant cites numerous cases on the importance
of cross-examination, he fails to cite a single case that
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requires the prosecution to call witnesses on defendant's behalf.
On the other hand, the Idaho Court of Appeals has specifically
held that the prosecution's failure to call a witness does not
implicate a defendant's confrontation rights.
Idaho 25, 674 P.2d 454, 457 (Ct. App. 1983).

State v. Sena, 106
Indeed, the weight

of authority suggests that the prosecution has no duty to call
witnesses for the defense.

As the Mississippi Supreme Court

bluntly stated, "Neither the appellant, nor the court, instructs
the State, or any other party to litigation, what witnesses that
party shall put on the stand or how that party shall present its
case."

Hickson v. State, 512 So.2d 1, 3 (Miss. 1987).

Beverly v. State, 543 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (Ind. 1989).

See also
But see

State v. Larson, 453 N.W.2d 42, 47 (Minn.), vacated, 111 S. Ct.
29 (1990) (state should call child witness whose hearsay
statements are being used as evidence against defendant).
In the instant case, the lower court found "that the
State can call and use whatever witnesses it feels are necessary,
and is under no obligation to call witnesses for the defense.
Had the defendant wanted Mr. Johnson's testimony, he could have
issued a subpoena." (R. 185-86) (See Appendix "A"; Memorandum
Decision).

Having knowledge of Johnson's potential testimony,

defendant chose neither to subpoena Johnson nor call him as a
witness.

Defendant cannot now complain that the State failed to

call him as a witness.
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POINT III
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON DEFENDANT'S CLAIM
THAT THE PROSECUTOR REFERRED IN HIS OPENING
STATEMENT TO EVIDENCE NOT INTRODUCED AT TRIAL
Defendant argues that the prosecutor made improper
reference in his opening statement to burglar tools which were
not introduced at trial.

Once again, defendant's claim must

fail.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of
an opening statement is to apprise the jury of what counsel
intends to prove by providing an overview of the facts counsel
intends to prove.

State v. Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah

1982); See also State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1254 (Utah
1988), on reconsideration, 776 P.2d 631 (Utah 1989) (continued
vitality of Williams).

In reviewing an opening statement on

appeal, the test is whether the statements, viewed against the
entire argument, deprived defendant of a fair trial.

United

States v. Wilkinson, 754 F.2d 1427, 1435 (2d Cir.), cert, denied
sub, nom., Shipp v. United States, 472 U.S. 1019 (1985).

The

Missouri Court of Appeals has held that "[w]hen the prosecutor
has reasonable grounds to believe that the facts stated can be
proved, the statement is not improper."
S.W.2d 630, 636 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).

State v. Drinkard, 750

See Commonwealth v.

Lamrini, 392 Mass. 427, 467 N.E.2d 95, 99 n.4 (1984); State v.
Freeman, 539 So.2d 739, 744 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 543
So.2d 17 (La. 1989); State v. Maillian, 464 So.2d 1071, 1075 (La.
Ct. App.), writ denied, 469 So. 2d 982 (La. 1985).
As part of his opening statement, the prosecutor
-8-

informed the jury that he intended to introduce several
screwdrivers and a pry bar which the jury could compare with the
marks on the doorjams of the motel rooms (T. 53-54).

However,

during trial, defendant objected to the tools, arguing they had
been illegally seized (T. 221). Both the prosecutor and defense
counsel discussed the propriety of the seizure with Judge Harding
(T. 222-26, 232-36).

The tools ultimately were not admitted,

although it is unclear whether they were suppressed by the judge,
or whether the prosecutor simply agreed not to offer them (T.
233-35).
The record is clear that the prosecutor acted in good
faith.

He fully expected to introduce the tools into evidence.

He could not foresee defendant's objection since he considered
the tools to be legally seized in plain view under a search
warrant on defendant's vehicle (T. 233). Additionally, defendant
had not sought a pretrial suppression ruling as required by Rule
12(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Since the prosecutor's

remarks were not prejudicial to the outcome and he did not act in
bad faith, defendant's claim of error must fail.

See United

States v. Obreqon, 893 F.2d 1307 (11th Cir.), cert, denied, 110
S. Ct. 1833 (1990);

United States v. Tolman, 826 F.2d 971, 973

(10th Cir. 1987) .
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POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL ON DEFENDANT'S CLAIM
THAT A STATE'S WITNESS WAS INTOXICATED AT
TRIAL.
Defendant claims that Margarite Byrge testified while
intoxicated and that her alleged intoxication denied him a fair
trial.

Once again, defendant's position lacks merit.
Rule 601 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that

M

[e]very person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise

provided in these rules."

Id.

The Utah Supreme Court has

previously held that the fact that witness is a drug addict goes
not to competency,

but to the witness's credibility.

Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114, 1116-17 (Utah 1977)

State v.

The West Virginia

Supreme Court of Appeals recently held that an intoxicated
witness will be excluded only if he does not know what he is
testifying to.
1990).
Id.

State v. Porter, 392 S.E.2d 216, 223 (W. Va.

Otherwise, a witness's intoxication goes to credibility.

See United States v. Ramirez, 871 F.2d 582, 584 (6th Cir.),

cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 127 (1989) (applying Rule 601, Federal
Rules of Evidence).

See also State v. Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404,

661 P.2d 1105, 1121, cert, denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983); Mirin v.
State, 93 Nev. 57, 560 P.2d 145, 145 (1977); State v. Hall, 464
So.2d 966, 969 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
The crux of defendant's argument is that the jury
should have been informed of Byrge's alleged intoxication.

To

support his claim that Byrge was intoxicated, defendant presented
in support of his motion for new trial an affidavit from his
investigator stating the investigator detected the odor of
-10-

alcohol on Byrge's breath immediately after she had testified (R.
177-78).

However, defendant chose to release Byrge as a witness

the next day, rather than call her to the stand (T. 236). If
defendant wanted to question Byrge about her alleged
intoxication, he had every opportunity to do so.

His failure to

timely raise the issue or request a cautionary jury instruction
constitutes waiver.

See State v. Hales, 652 P.2d 1290, 1292

(Utah 1982) .
Additionally, Judge Harding stated in his Memorandum
Decision:
Defense alleges that Margarite Burge
[sic] might have been impaired by drugs or
alcohol and was therefor an unreliable
witness. The Court is not aware of any
evidence that Ms. Burge [sic] was impaired at
the time she testified. The only evidence is
that she had alcohol on her breath after the
trial. During trial the Court did not detect
any evidence that she was impaired in any
way. The testimony presented at trial was
more helpful to the defendant than damaging.
(R. 186) (See Appendix A ) . Judge Harding was in a position to
observe Byrge's demeanor and the responsiveness of her answers.
He clearly determined that Byrge was not impaired.

See United

States v. Bevens# 728 F. Supp. 340, 346-47 (E.D. Pa. 1990),
aff'd, 914 F.2d 244 (3rd Cir. 1990).

He also concluded that

because Byrge's testimony was more favorable to defendant than
damaging, defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to inquire
into Byrge's sobriety at trial.
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
this Court to affirm defendant's convictions.
DATED this

/ /"*— day of November, 1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

K <~~
DAN R.

rfffr^sz

LARSEN

Assistant Attorney General
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellee was mailed, postage pre-paid to
Milton T. Harmon, attorney for appellant, P.O. Box 97, Nephi, UT
84648, this

/y^-flay of November, 1990.
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APPENDIX A

txnwry CUES;*
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DISTRICT COURT

MILLARD COUNTY
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

— . Clerk
Deputy

^JJ

OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY
a******************

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER 1090

-vs-

RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE

RICHARD LEE CRAWFORD,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

*********************

The Court, having considered defendant's motion for a
new trial, will again deny that motion. The Court will also deny
defendant's special motion for discovery.
Defendant has made a number of claims of error in his
motion for a new trial, which the Court considered in it's
earlier motion denying a new trial. At the present time, the
only claim of error which appears to have merit is that the State
withheld evidence concerning the testimony of Steve Johnson.
Defendant claims that the State did not disclose information
concerning the date Steve Johnson might have obtained a bedspread
from the defendant and which could have been exculpatory. After
consideration of the memoranda and affidavits which have been
submitted, the Court finds that the defendant received all of the
information which they were entitled to concerning the possible
testimony of Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson was present and testified
at the preliminary hearing. The defendant had ample opportunity
to call Mr. Johnson and examine him concerning the bedspread.
Defendant also claims that Mr. Johnson was sent home
from the trial by the State and could not testify. The Court
finds that the State can call and use whatever witnesses it feels
1

Q001SJ

are necessary, and is under no obligation to call witnesses for
the defense. Had the defendant wanted Mr. Johnson's testimony,
he could have issued a subpoena.
Defendant alleges that Margarite Burge might have been
impaired by drugs or alcohol and was therefor an unreliable
witness. The Court is not aware of any evidence that Ms. Burge
was impaired at the time she testified. The only evidence is
that she had alcohol on her breath after the trial. During trial
the Court did not detect any evidence that she was impaired in
any way. The testimony presented by Ms. Burge at trial was more
helpful to the defendant than damaging.
After careful consideration of all of the claim of
error made by the defendant, the Court finds that the defendant
has not shown that there was error, and that the error might have
made a difference in the outcome of the trial. State v. Eaton,
569 P.2d 1114 (1977). The Court finds that the critical piece of
evidence in this case was the fingerprint placing the defendant
at the scene of the crime and in contact with the stolen
property.
Regarding the discovery issues, the Court finds that
the State disclosed all information which it was required to
disclose. The special motion for discovery is therefore denied.
Dated this 24th day of April, 1989.

Milton T. Harmon. Esq.
Dexter L. Anderson, Esq.

2
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APPENDIX B

COUNTY CLERK
A EX*OFFICIO CLERK OF THE
DISTRICT COURT

k COUNTY CLERK
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DEXTER L . ANDERSON, # 0 0 8 4
MILLARD COUNTY DEPUTY ATTORNEY _ _ _ _ A _ _
^ ^ ^
S . R. Box 5 2 , 750 S . Highway 9 ^ O L L A R E COUNTY
F i l l m o r e , Utah 84631
—
Vj
Telephone:
(801) 743-6522
JM^
tiepoiy

AUG ro\989

MILLARD COUNTY
^M

Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND
SPECIAL DISCOVERY

RICHARD LEE CRAWFORD
Defendant.

Case No. 88-1219

The Court having entered its Memorandum Decision herein
dated April 24, 1989; and having thereafter considered
Defendants Counsels' letter concerning an error in the
prosecution1s memorandum reciting that Steve Johnson
testified personally at the Preliminary Hearing, when in fact
he did not, the Court hereby finds as follows:
1.

Defendant's Counsel and Defendant were made aware of

the witness, Steve Johnson, and the bedspread in possession
of the Millard County Sheriff's Office retreived from Steve
Johnson, through the testimony of Officer John Kimball, who
did testify at the Preliminary Hearing.

(See Defendant's

Memorandum in Response to Plaintiff's Memorandum Opposing
A New Trial dated March 31, 1989.)
2.

The Court further finds that even though Mr. Johnson

was not present at the Preliminary Hearing, the Defendant
received all the information which he was entitled to concerning the possible testimony of Mr. Johnson and the second

Deputy

bedspread.

The Defendant had ample opportunity to call

Mr. Johnson and examine him concerning
the Defendant
3.

the bedspread, had

wanted to issue a subpoena.

After careful consideration of all of the claims of

error made by the Defendantf the Court finds that the
Defendant has not shown that there was error, and that the
error might have made a difference in the outcome of the trial.
THEREFORE/ IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for
a New Trial is overruled and denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, consistant with this Court's
Memorandum Decision/ dated April 24/ 2989/ that Defendant's
Special Motion for Discovery is also oj&e«?uled and denied.
DATED this

2Z5T

day^df H < ^ /

, 1989.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Order Denying Defendant's Motion for New Trial and
Special Discovery to Attorneys for Defendant:
^a^Ui^L^-,
tWf
LeRay G. Jackson
297 North Highway 6, 545
Delta, Utah 84624

Milton T. Harmon
36 South Main Street
Nephi, Utah 84648
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